Angels and Demons: The Capitalist and the Proletariat from the perspective of Agency Theory
o principal e o agente sob a ótica da teoria da agência
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22409/eas.v10i1.65063Keywords:
Agency theory, Principal-agent, Social paradigm, Capitalism, Critical theoryAbstract
This theoretical essay aims to reflect on the condition of the principal (employee) and the agent (owner of the means of production) from the perspective of agency theory, highlighting the limitations that this model imposes on organizational studies. To achieve this, an analysis was conducted on the origins and paradigms underpinning agency theory, along with an evaluation of the influence of a capitalist socio-economic model on ethical perceptions of workers and owners of the means of production. From this reflection, it was observed that the functionalist bias of the theory, coupled with its constitution within a capitalist economic-financial model, leads to the demonization of the employee and the sanctification of the owner. The owner is conveniently portrayed as an individual at risk of being harmed, while the employee is depicted as one who acts in bad faith. This study contributes to the field of organizational theories by exploring a significant paradigm that can influence research in this area and deserves the attention of scholars.
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